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Abstract
Co-investment funds – which invest alongside private investors, especially business angels –
thereby leveraging their networks and experience and minimizing public sector transaction
costs – are a recent approach by governments in various countries to address the early stage
entrepreneurial funding gap which is perceived as a barrier to the ability of firms to scale-up.
However, little literature exists on their operation, impact and effectiveness. This paper assesses
the early operation of the UK’s Angel Co-investment Fund, established in 2011. Interview
evidence from angels and business managers suggests that the Angel Co-investment Fund is
improving the availability of finance by enabling firms to raise funding rounds of between
»500,000 and »2m, hence addressing some aspects of the broken finance escalator model.
However, our evidence suggests that it is not yet impacting the supply side, either in terms of
stimulating the formation of new angel groups or enhancing learning amongst less experienced
angels. Some aspects of the operation of the investment process have attracted criticism from
angels and entrepreneurs which need to be addressed. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence
for positive impact to justify the scheme’s expansion.
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Introduction
Policy interventions to address the funding gap for entrepreneurial ventures have largely
involved the establishment of Government Venture Capital Funds (GVCFs) to invest in
those parts of the market which private sector VCs avoid, typically in the sub-»250,000
range but increasingly also larger amounts as VC funds have progressively shifted to larger
and later stage investments, and in peripheral regions (Baldock and North, 2015; Lerner, 2009,
2010; Mason and Pierrakis, 2013; Murray, 2007; Technopolis, 2011). Over time this approach
has shifted from direct investment via publicly funded and managed funds to hybrid funds
(Murray, 2007) in which public money is used to leverage private investment into funds that
are operated by private sector fund managers. These hybrid fund principles are now
increasingly used by governments to establish co-investment funds (CIFs). These fall into
two distinct categories. First, some CIFs pre-approve their investment partners (angel
groups and venture capital funds): every investment that these partners make that meet the
investment criteria of the CIF will automatically attract co-investment. Second, there are CIFs
which make their own decision on every investment opportunity that is brought to them.
However, both approaches maintain the principle in which public sector money follows
private sector investors – both VC funds and business angels, but more often the latter –
investing alongside them in deals that these investors bring to the CIF, and thereby
leveraging their networks and expertise and at the same time minimising the public
sector’s transaction costs.
The concept is widely attributed to the creation of the Scottish Co-investment Fund,
established in 2003 in response to the contraction of the VC sector following the post-
2000 technology crash (Pierrakis, 2010; Technopolis, 2011). It has since been replicated in
New Zealand and Ontario, Canada. CIF schemes have also been established in various UK
regions, notably by the former Regional Development Agencies and in London (London
Seed Capital). Co-investment schemes have also been established in several other countries,
including Denmark (since closed), Sweden, Belgium, Germany and Portugal. More recently
in 2012 the EU, through the European Investment Fund (EIF), established pilot European
Angels Fund (EAF) CIFs in Germany, Spain and Austria and will soon expand the scheme
to other EU countries (EIF, 2015). However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the design
and emphasis of these various schemes.
The importance of evaluating GVCF schemes at an early stage has been highlighted by
several authors (Baldock, 2016; Lerner, 2009, 2010; Tokila and Haapanen, 2009). Whilst this
cannot predict scheme success it can adjust for agency failures around poor management and
mission creep, and assess scheme additionality versus duplication (Baldock, 2016). This
enables design improvements to be made around management, promotion and
implementation (e.g. selection processes) and to establish wider impacts on the supply-side
(Lerner, 2010), including the business angel community (Mason and Harrison, 2015) and VC
development (Baldock, 2016).
This paper is an attempt to address this need for early evaluation. It examines the role,
operation and initial impacts of the UK Angel Co-investment Fund (ACF). Established in
2011, the ACF oﬀers up to 49% matching funds for angel investments with between
»100,000 and »1m public spending cap per investment. The Fund has two aims: ﬁrst,
conventionally, to invest alongside angel groups to enlarge the funding round and
facilitate follow-on funding, giving investee businesses suﬃcient ﬁnancial ‘runway’ in
which to scale; and second, to stimulate the supply side by encouraging the creation of
new angel groups and disseminating best practice in investing.
The paper proceeds by examining current theoretical debate around CIFs and their role in
overcoming a seemingly broken entrepreneurial funding escalator. It then presents an
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overview of the ACF, research methodology and propositions and key ﬁndings, focusing on
the scheme’s business demand-side and business angel supply-side impacts. It concludes with
theory, policy and further research observations.
Co-investment Funds: A theoretical review
This section examines early stage entrepreneurial ﬁnance gap theories in the context of the
developing post GFC UK ﬁnance escalator. It then goes on to consider key agency and
design theories relating to the operation and delivery of government VC funds (GVCFs) and
more speciﬁcally the evolution of Angel-Oriented CIFs (A-OCIFs).
The finance escalator, finance gaps and emerging new UK escalator
The need for CIFs arises on account of the break-down of the so-called funding escalator
(NESTA, 2009) which provides a supply-side theory-informed representation of the diﬀerent
types of entrepreneurial ﬁnance available to businesses as they progress from seed ﬁnance
through the stages of development to a trade sale or IPO1 (for example, see NESTA, 2009).
This adopts Berger and Udell’s (1998) entrepreneurial ﬁnance model which explains how the
range of ﬁnance available to businesses changes and increases as they become less opaque
and overcome information asymmetries with funders. Baldock and Mason (2015) adopt
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order theory of entrepreneurial preferences for types
of ﬁnance, suggesting that within equity ﬁnance, some entrepreneurs will prefer more
personalised and tailored angel ﬁnance over the more formal and less intensive support of
VC managers.
Indeed, post-GFC, the role of angels as a source of risk capital has increased signiﬁcantly
both in the UK and internationally (OECD, 2011; Wilson and Silva, 2013). In those
countries where data are available there was either no decline in business angel investment
in the immediate aftermath of the GFC (Mason and Harrison (2015) or only modest short-
term decline and subsequent strong growth (EBAN, 2014; Sohl, 2015), in marked contrast to
trends in bank lending and venture capital investment (Wilson and Silva, 2013). This has
fundamentally damaged the often critical complementarity between business angel and VC
funds, which, in turn, has severely undermined the funding escalator (Gill, 2010). It has also
been a key driver for angels to group together into managed angel groups to create the
ﬁnancial capacity to make follow-on investments to bridge this widening VC gap (Mason
et al., 2013).
Recent UK evidence suggests an emerging post-GFC ﬁnance escalator that has been
impacted by a number of structural and cyclical changes. First, the banks have retreated
to a ‘new norm’ of not providing equity ﬁnance under loan terms and conditions and,
therefore, not funding early stage businesses with less than two year trading records
(Davis, 2011). Second, private VCs have retreated from early stage investment, a trend
that is traceable to the Dot.com bubble burst (Wiltbank, 2009) and evidenced by Murray
(2007) and Mason and Pierrakis (2013). Third, a much tougher post-GFC investment exit
market for trade sales and IPOs (given the illiquidity of the UK AIM2 public feeder
market for small cap ﬁrms, Baldock, 2015) has led to the extension of investment
horizons (CfEL, 2013; Mason et al., 2010). This has resulted in the locking-in of angel
and VC funds as these investors have been forced to maintain and continue to ﬁnance
those companies in their portfolios that were unable to exit3 (or abort and lose
investments). Fourth, the seed capital market has been revitalised by the introduction
of the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) investor tax incentives in 2012.4
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However, the consequence has been the creation of a ‘series A crunch’ with increasing
numbers of seed capital-backed companies seeking follow-on investment. A ﬁnal change
has been the exacerbation of the ‘Rowlands gap’ (Rowlands, 2009; SQW, 2009) for
patient capital. Recent evidence from Baldock et al. (2015) found two persistent gaps
for longer horizon (R&D taking ﬁve years plus to reach market) early and growth stage
ﬁnance (particularly in the 2–5 year trading stage). The ﬁrst is the classic »200,000 to
»2m gap which the UK ACF is seeking to address and the second is the ‘series A-B
time-bomb’ where larger scale »2 to »10m plus ﬁnance is required for relatively young
pre-trading or early trading businesses with under the »5m annual sales turnover
qualiﬁcation for the Business Growth Fund (BGF).5 The ability of the ACF to
provide follow-on funding may provide an important bridge in this respect.
GVCFs and emerging role of CIFs
Co-investment Funds are a relatively recent public sector response to these structural
changes in the supply of entrepreneurial ﬁnance. They have emerged during a period of
increasing perceived need and reliance on government interventions (Mason and Pierrakis,
2013; Murray, 2007; Wilson and Silva, 2013) to address the seed and early stage funding gap
post the Dot.com crisis (2001).
Very few GVCFS have been deemed successful (Brander et al., 2008; Colombo et al.,
2014; Lerner, 2009; Mason, 2016; Munari and Toschi, 2014). Many have experienced agency
failures (Akerlof, 1976) leading to inadequate approaches to information asymmetries
(e.g. ineﬀective due diligence) and policy implementation. This has occurred through too
much government control with investment decisions made by bureaucrats rather than
experts (Lerner, 2002), their inappropriate investment focus (size of investment, sector,
geography) and insuﬃciently skilled local VC managers.
A major ﬁnding of Lerner (2009, 2010), stemming from Israel’s Yozma funds
transformation of Israel’s VC industry from 1993, was the importance of enabling private
sector VC leadership and attracting leading, experienced fund managers internationally to
take the lead on investment decisions and to train and develop local junior VC managers
(North and Baldock, 2016). Studies point to the importance of experienced hands-on private
sector fund managers, indicating that successful VCs have niche ‘hard to imitate’ knowledge
of sectors and stages (BIS, 2011) and are persistent performers who build on their experience
over time (Gompers et al., 2010; Zarutskie, 2010). This argument can be extended to the key
role of experienced business angels in leading angel investment groups and their ability to
pass on their skills to junior angel investors through syndication and networking activities.
This can potentially raise angel investment standards through communities of practice
(Mason and Harrison, 2015; Mason et al., 2016).
Murray (2007) describes the development of private VC-led CIFs as ‘hybrid funds’, where
government provides a proportion of funding to lever matched funding from private VCs. A
key feature of these schemes is their diﬀerent approaches to incentivising and encouraging
private investment. These can be generated directly through setting attractive minimum
matching percentage requirements for private investors (i.e. one third for UK ECFs,6
50% for the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund (NZVIF) and 51% for the ACF)
and scheme upside investment returns (e.g. UK ECFs7), or through allowing indirect tax
breaks such as the UK’s SEIS8 for angel investors which applies to the ACF (Baldock and
Mason, 2015).
Lerner (2010) suggests that the emphasis on CIFs to ﬁnance experienced and previously
successful private fund managers and allow them to make business portfolio investment
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decisions within the parameters of the schemes (e.g. sector, location, business stage)
improves targeting into viable businesses. However, he also recognises that investments
require regular monitoring for market distortion and duplication (Leleux and Surlemont,
2003) and mission creep (Murray et al., 2009) to ensure that schemes continue to address
funding gaps. We now look more speciﬁcally at CIF design.
CIF design theories
Mounting evidence has also led to an understanding of key GVCF design features (Baldock,
2016). First, Lerner (2010), Technopolis (2011), Cumming et al. (2014) and Baldock and
North (2015) recognise that funds require suﬃcient size, scale and range. Small-scale,
regional and sector speciﬁc funds often fail to ﬁnd suﬃcient high quality investments, or
have insuﬃcient funding for follow-on investments into their better performing portfolio
companies. This leads to a failure to achieve Markowitz (1952) optimal VC portfolio fund
size and to facilitate follow-on investment to keep their best portfolio ﬁrms to a point of
optimal exit, typically via trade sale or IPO (Cumming et al., 2014).
Second, Lerner (2010) highlighted Yozma’s 10 year restricted Limited Partnership funds
as encouraging a cycle of dynamic fund investment and return redistribution into new funds,
overcoming the potential for mission creep and poor incentive to deliver returns experienced
by evergreen public VC schemes (e.g. GVCFs in Finland: Murray et al., 2009). However,
investment horizons for early stage investments to reach exit, notably post-GFC, have
doubled from four to eight years on average between 2000 and 2015 (Axelson and
Martinovic, 2012; Mason and Harrison, 2015), requiring ﬂexible ‘long game’ thinking in
relation to VC programme length (Lerner, 2010).9
Third, this has brought into sharper focus the need for second fund ﬁnancing rotation
(Baldock, 2016; Dittmer et al., 2014), or to revisit evergreen funding options, such as through
deal based CIFs (Baldock and Mason, 2015). These can potentially combine with the trend
for larger angel groups to make ongoing multiple rounds of funding by stretching their
funding capability, even in some cases enabling them to take businesses to an exit without
raising follow-on investment from VC funds.
Finally, Hopp (2010) and Baldock (2016) introduce VC management practice as a way of
smoothing portfolio companies’ funding continuity through improved syndication between
VCs and angel groups notably in developing international investment and market
opportunities. This can be extended to angel-led investments, such as those operating
through the ACF. Here, the scheme’s scale-up of angel investment may oﬀer more
opportunities for angel groups to negotiate syndicated VC partnership arrangements on
equal terms, empowering them to avoid negative later stage ‘VC crushing’. In this respect,
Mason et al.’s (2016) development of Wenger et al.’s (2002) communities of practice theory,
suggests that angel groups, such as those operating under the ACF, can enable diﬀusion of
best practice angel investment, raising investment quality and improving ability to syndicate,
follow-on fund and successfully exit.
The emerging role of Angel-Oriented CIFs
From the early 2000s, other forms of co-funding arrangements have emerged which focus on
providing government funding which could be matched to individual business investment
deals. Many, such as the pioneering Scottish Co-investment Fund and the New Zealand Seed
Co-investment Fund, primarily operate with business angels, since they are responding to the
early stage funding gap vacated by private VCs during this period (Mason and Pierrakis,
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2013; Murray, 2007). This study focuses on recent A-OCIFs development and speciﬁcally the
role of the UK ACF.
A-OCIFs are typically evergreen in design, working on a revolving fund principle of
reinvesting returns. In the post-GFC economic environment with increased investment
exit timetables the greater ﬂexibility aﬀorded to the evergreen ACF is considered by
industry experts (BVCA, UKBAA, EIF10) to be a considerable advantage (Baldock and
Mason, 2015).
There is little literature on A-OCIFs. The main sources are an early evaluation of the
Scottish CIF (Hayton et al., 2008) and overviews by the Swedish Agency for Growth Policy
Analysis (Tillva¨xtanalys) (2009, 2013). International overviews are provided by Wilson and
Silva (2013), EBAN (2012), OECD (2011) and Aernoudt et al. (2007). They highlight a small
but growing number of A-OCIFs dedicated to angel investment operating at national and
regional scales with several common features. The CIF invests a maximum of 50% of the
total investment in the business with an upper limit to the size of its investment: for the
Scottish CIF this was initially »500,000 and subsequently increased to »1m. Matched
funding is usually equity based, although some schemes have provided loan funding.
Normally the equity funding is made on a pari passu basis (i.e. with no direct private
sector return incentive) with the CIF investing on the same terms and conditions as the
private investor.
The main contrast between A-OCIFs relates to their involvement in identifying and
selecting investments. The Scottish CIF is passive, based on selecting approved private
sector investment partners – managed angel groups and VC funds. The investments that
these partners bring to the Fund automatically qualify for co-investment if they fall within its
parameters (e.g. sector). The Scottish CIF, therefore, does not generate its own deal ﬂow,
undertake its own due diligence or play any part in the investment (but retains board rights).
It invests on identical terms and conditions as its private investors. So, rather than ‘picking
winners’ (businesses) as in the past, in this model the public sector is ‘picking partners’
(investors), removing any uncertainty for the investor, and reducing scheme operating
costs to a minimum (Hayton et al., 2008). This model has low delivery costs.
Other A-OCIFs are more actively managed, inviting investors to bring deals to them, or
they may approve deals from particular sources, such as speciﬁc business angel networks
(BANs). For example, London Seed Capital co-invests with the London BAN. The critical
diﬀerence with this co-investment model is that these Funds make their own investment
decisions and may invest on diﬀerent terms and conditions to those of the angel group. For
example, London Seed Capital co-invests with the London BAN.
Although evidence is limited, A-OCIFs appear to have signiﬁcantly increased the volume
of investment activity in the early stage equity market, enabling angels to participate in
larger deals than would otherwise have been the case. However, the only scheme to have
been evaluated is the Scottish CIF (Hayton et al., 2008) and this is now dated. This
highlights angel groups as the main partners, representing 82% of its early investments
(and likely to be higher post GFC). By oﬀering matched funding the A-OCIF provided
angel groups with greater liquidity to make new investments, larger investment and
develop substantial follow-on investments that were otherwise not possible.
A-OCIFs have three limitations. First, like other GVCFs, they are constrained by the
supply of investable businesses. The partners in the Scottish CIF identiﬁed investment
readiness as an issue, notably in the West of Scotland. One way in which the funds
overcome this is by operating at a national scale and across a wide range of sectors to
ensure that suﬃcient numbers of viable investible businesses can be found. This could
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potentially include investing pan-nationally (Dittmer et al., 2014), as in the case of some
VC-led CIFs such as the UK Innovation Investment Fund (Baldock and Mason, 2015).
Second, CIFs require to partner with organised angel groups in order to provide eﬃcient
gateways for collective angel funding into the schemes (Mason and Harrison, 2015). The
existence of angel groups is therefore critical. This requirement clearly limits their role in
regions with undeveloped angel markets, or dominated by angels investing individually or in
ad hoc groups. In this regard the abolition of the English Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs) in 2012, which funded the development of regional business angel networks (which
provided an introduction service to enable angels and entrepreneurs to connect) may have
undermined the ability of the ACF to invest across the UK. The recent emergence of
managed angel groups – angels who invest together rather than as individuals or small ad
hoc groups (Mason et al., 2016) – has therefore also been critical for the establishment of
A-OCIFs. Scotland was fortunate in having a handful of established angel groups at the time
that the Scottish CIF was conceived. Indeed, these groups had lobbied hardest for this type
of initiative. The success of the Scottish CIF can be linked in large measure to the
encouragement and support for new angel groups undertaken in parallel by LINC
Scotland, the trade body for business angels (Mason et al., 2016). A further consideration
is therefore that Wilson and Silva (2013) ﬁnd that A-OCIFs give little consideration to
investor training which, given the importance of their working with organised angel
groups, may form an important agency related policy consideration.
Third, there is a possible risk of moral hazard, with angel groups funding their best deals
themselves but bringing their weaker deals to the A-OCIF. However, in practice there is no
evidence to support this concern, since the main advantage of the A-OCIF is to stretch-fund
investments to create more substantial and sustainable investments (Baldock and
Mason, 2015).
Despite their growth, there has been relatively little policy evaluation of CIFs. Moreover,
the demand-side is often overlooked in such evaluations (Wilson and Silva, 2013). The recent
study of public UK VC by Munari and Toschi (2014), which focused on fund exits as a
barometer of success, highlighted the problems of fund evaluation, whilst Baldock and
Mason (2015) and Baldock (2016) note that it is even more diﬃcult to evaluate funds at
an early stage, prior to exits. However, as Lerner (2010) suggests, early stage evaluations are
about addressing agency and programme design and delivery issues to reﬁne schemes,
ensuring that they are operating eﬃciently in addressing a market gap, demonstrating
additionality, avoiding duplication and displacement and avoiding mission creep. At the
early stage, therefore, focus should be on scheme processes such as promotional visibility
and accessibility (including timelines to accessing ﬁnance), additionality and spillover
measurements (Baldock, 2016; Baldock and Mason, 2015) and assessments of
displacement (Lerner, 2010) between public funds and crowding out of the private sector
(Leleux and Surlemont, 2003).
Overview of the ACF
The UK government’s »100m11 ACF, launched November 2011, invests between »100,000
and »1m in SMEs alongside syndicates of business angels.12 Qualifying SMEs have under
250 employees, E50m annual sales turnover and E43m of assets on their balance sheet.13 All
sectors are eligible, with investments addressing the current equity ﬁnance gap for early
stage, potential high growth ﬁrms. The ACF is evergreen, reinvesting investment returns
to enable its perpetual operation. Initially, restricted to England, following Parliamentary
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Assent in Spring 2014, it now has a UK-wide investment mandate. At the time of this early
assessment all 39 ACF initial investments were in England.14
The ACF operates as a private company limited by guarantee, at arm’s length from
Government with British Business Bank oversight.15 It can contribute a maximum 49%
of deal investment, typically averaging 25%–30%, with the maximum permissable
company shareholding being 30%. At the time of the research, after 26 months, »67m
had been invested into 39 companies and nine follow-on investments, including over
»13.75m from the ACF16 (Table 1). By April 2016, this has risen to 59 company
investments, 35 follow-on investments, with total ACF funding invested »27.5m
(Terrelonge, 2016).
The ACF has two aims: (i) to address the current potential high growth SME ﬁnance gap;
and (ii) to increase the number of UK business angels and raise their investing competence
through disseminating best practice. A distinction from other UK Scottish and RDA CIFs is
that it undertakes individual deal-based assessment. Investment opportunities must come
through syndicates of at least three private angel investors who are independent of the
business and investing in it for the ﬁrst time, although other investors in the round,
outside the syndicate, can form a mix of new and existing investors. Syndicates need not
be formally constituted, but require a Lead Angel to ‘lead’ the investment process as
principal contact with the ACF.
The syndicate’s role is to identify high potential SMEs seeking ﬁnance, perform due
diligence, negotiate terms with the businesses, counterparty legal documents, drive the
transaction and monitor and support the investee business in the post-investment stage.17
In situations where syndicates want to invest in a speciﬁc business but cannot provide the
entire equity requirement, their Lead Angel can bring the proposition to the ACF.
Investment decisions are made by an Investment Committee (IC) of the ACF based on a
detailed funding proposal prepared by the angels and a telephone interview with the Lead
Angel. Table 2 provides a summary of the ACF’s application and investment process,
including the constitution of the IC.
Interest in the ACF has been high, with circa 250 enquiries in its ﬁrst 26 months.
However, attrition at the initial review stage has been about 80%, with some rejections,
but mainly due to syndicates withdrawing or not following through on their initial contact.
After passing initial screening review syndicates are requested to submit a business overview
Table 1. ACF Scheme Metrics 2011–2013.
ACF Scheme Metrics: 2011–2013
Number of companies invested in 39
Total number of investment rounds 48
Total ACF invested »13.756m
Total additional investment to ACF »53.37m
Average ACF company investment »352,000
Average ACF company shareholding 9.3%
Average investment round size »1.43m
Number of Lead Angel co-investors 33
Number of angel syndicates involved 24
Exits 1
Closures 3
Source: British Business Bank, December 2013.
ACF: Angel Co-investment Fund.
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Investment Paper (14–16 pages18). IC assessment is based on this paper and a 45min
telephone interview session with the Lead Angel, focusing on three main issues:
(i) Does the investment oﬀer the prospect of a commercial return, relative to the risk?
(ii) Does the Lead Angel have a detailed understanding of the business, based on suﬃcient
due diligence, enabling them to convincingly explain why the proposal represents a
good investment?
(iii) Are the terms and conditions appropriate?
As such, the IC is judging the Lead Angel as much as the business.
The IC approves over 80% (39 of 47 applications) of the investments it considers.
Rejected applications are not allowed to revise and resubmit. If the ACF decides to invest
then the syndicate must lead on the legal process and produce an investment agreement
incorporating standard terms. Where possible, the ACF follows the investment terms of the
syndicate,19 although the IC occasionally requires investment agreement revision. This is one
aspect of the investment process in which the ACF seeks to spread best practice.
Where the ACF invests, a one-oﬀ fee of 2.5% of the amount that it invests is payable to
the syndicate to cover the costs of providing on-going information to the IC. The ACF
expects to make follow-on investments in many cases, with the same or diﬀerent angel
syndicates, subject to further IC approval. Accordingly, for every »1 it invests it holds a
further »1 back for potential follow-on rounds. The ACF aims to be a passive investor,
without an appointed director or Board Meeting observer, but retains these rights.
Table 2. Summary of the investment process of the ACF.
1) Deal source: a business angel syndicate sources an investment, agrees Heads of Terms and begins due
diligence. In practice, there may well be existing angels who are seeking funding from other angels in order to
generate a substantial funding round and the scheme requires a new angel to lead an ACF application.
2) Initial review: once there is a viable proposition, the ACF administration team review it for eligibility
and quality. This is perceived by both angel and business applicants, as well as industry stakeholders such as
UKBAA, as a crucial point in the journey, as it is essential that applicants are aware of their chances for
success and inappropriate applications are filtered out early in this process.
3) Prepare Investment Papers: suitable, eligible applications then undergo a period of investment
proposal and due diligence development in order to ensure that the proposal achieves best practice
industry standards. The ACF administrators provide guidance in order for the investment papers to meet
the standards required for the Investment Committee.
4) Investment Committee: an independent Investment Committee (IC), which has thus far had no
contact with the application, and meets twice monthly to consider applications. The IC is a 10 member panel,
drawn equally from private investment and institutional fund manager investment backgrounds. Sub-groups
of 4–5 make decisions, considering three basic tests: whether the deal is commercially reasonable; whether
satisfactory due diligence has been carried out; whether there is investor alignment between ACF, matching
new angels and existing investors. Deals may be accepted unconditionally, accepted subject to revision, or
rejected.
5) Legal stages and completion: once the IC has agreed the deal the syndicate leads on legal process,
incorporating standard terms under the ACF.
6) Portfolio and partnership: ACF is light touch, with syndicates leading on monitoring investments and
sharing information with the ACF. The syndicate is also required to share future investment opportunities
with the ACF, although this does not appear to apply to variants of the syndicate structure.
ACF: Angel Co-investment Fund; UKBAA: UK Business Angel Association.
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Methodology
The evidence presented here is derived from baseline scheme secondary data provided by the
British Business Bank and original survey work undertaken in January and February 2014.
This involved face-to-face and telephone interviews with business Chief Executive Oﬃcers
(CEOs) and Lead business angel investors who successfully or unsuccessfully sought ACF
ﬁnance (including three angels experiencing both successful and failed applications),
stakeholders and key informants (Table 3). The business interviews comprised a
representative sample20 of investee businesses focusing on those funded by the scheme for
at least one year.21 The research examined scheme additionality (Baldock, 2016), whether it
was meeting a genuine ﬁnance gap (North et al., 2013) and the eﬀectiveness of the investment
processes (Lerner, 2010). The recent timing of investments restricted post scheme business
performance assessment. Business performance forecasts collected were checked against
Lead investor views to correct for the potential overestimation of business growth
potential by the CEOs (Baldock and North, 2015; CfEL, 2013).
The unsuccessful businesses and angels interviewed are drawn from the eight unsuccessful
applications to the IC. The successful and unsuccessful business case interviews were
matched to interviews with their Lead Angel investor applicants. Semi-structured survey
instruments proﬁled the respondent investor, business or key informant and speciﬁcally
examined the role and operation of the ACF, the process of ﬁnding and applying for the
ACF, the outcomes from successful or unsuccessful applications and the scheme’s impact on
the UK early stage equity market. Interviews typically took one hour and were cross-
checked with respondents for accuracy. The business data analyses used a mixture of
quantitative (e.g. ﬁnancial) and pre-coded categorical (e.g. broad sector, satisfaction
scales) data and qualitative responses which were input into Excel to provide linear
business case (all or subset business group) and variable content analyses, using key word
and phrase searches to form inductive group clusters and trend ﬁndings (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Yin, 2003). Both the qualitative business and investor data underwent double-blind post
Table 3. Survey respondents.
Respondent type % of Scheme
Companies:
15 company investments 38%
One exit 100%
One out of three failed investee companies 33%
Four out of eight unsuccessful company applicants 50%
Business angels:
15 of 33 successful Lead Angel applicants 45%
Seven out of eight unsuccessful Lead Angel applicants 88%
Stakeholders and experts:
Three out of 10 members of the Investment Committee (IC) 30%
Five industry organisation experts: n/a
- UK Business Angel Association (UKBAA)
- British Venture Capital Association (BVCA)
- European Investment Fund (EIF)
- St John’s Innovation Centre, Cambridge
- Angel News
Four Angel Capital Group investors n/a
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coding checks with senior research colleagues in order avoid interpretive bias. Additionally,
in order to fully apply a robustly triangulated mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2003)
12 key stakeholder and expert informant interviews were undertaken, either face-to-face or
by telephone, to gain greater understanding of the ACF in terms of its internal operations
and external role and impacts (Table 3).
Results
The ﬁndings presented examine three propositions exploring the aims of the ACF and
drawing on the ﬁnance gap and VC design theories presented:
P1: To what extent are ACF investments determined by the location of organised BANs, angel
investment sector preferences and demand from young early stage businesses? There is an
expectation that investments will be clustered into two types of regions: (i) those with
organised BANs (Mason and Harrison, 2015; Mason et al., 2013) and vibrant entrepreneurial
ecosystems with plentiful sources of seed capital that will have generated highly innovative
businesses positioned towards the end of early stage funding where angel group follow-on
funding would appear to require ACF stretch funding and (ii) those with large numbers of
short digitech businesses which oﬀer a investment horizon (Baldock, 2016; Baldock and
Mason, 2015). In reality there is a high level of overlap between these two geographies.
P2: To what extent is the ACF meeting the needs of the current UK ﬁnance escalator and
positively impacting on the funded businesses (Baldock and Mason, 2015; North et al., 2013)?
There is an expectation that the ACF will help to generate larger deal sizes than occurred
previously, while achieving considerable additionality, little displacement (Leleux and
Surlemont, 2003), eﬀective follow-on funding and providing timely, optimal exits (Baldock,
2016). Entrepreneur pecking order preferences for angels over VC might also be better served
(Baldock and Mason, 2015).
P3: To what extent is the ACF’s focus on syndication, individual deal quality selection and
dissemination of best practice encouraging and improving angel investing? The expectation is
that the scheme will lead to more organised angel group/network activity, with successful Lead
investor skills being passed on to both other investors in the group and also the wider angel
community through communities of practice (Mason and Harrison, 2015; Mason et al., 2013;
Mason et al., 2016), ultimately creating a sustainable evergreen CIF model that reduces
transaction costs (Hayton et al., 2008) and agency failures (Akerlof, 1976).
(P1) ACF supply orientation: location, sector, innovation and stage
Drawing initially on ACF scheme data for the 39 completed business investments at the
end of 2013, it is evident that although the scheme is ‘sector agnostic’, it has thus far
followed the angel investors’ attraction to current ‘hot’ sectors, notably digitechs
(software, gaming, online devices/services, ﬁntechs and meditechs) which represent
more than half of all investments (Table 4). Investments have largely been focused
where the concentrations of these ‘hot’ investments are located, notably Cambridge in
the East of England and London’s Tech City (Table 5) (Baldock, 2016; Baldock and
Mason, 2015). However, the pattern emerging across England also strongly reﬂects the
locations of the more organised angel syndicates in London, Cambridge and also the
North East (Mason and Harrison, 2015). Overall, nearly two-thirds of deals (64%) have
been with members of established angel networks, including a few angel capital groups,
with London Business angels accounting for almost one ﬁfth of deals (18%). However,
the investing angel syndicates are dominated by ad hoc groupings which vary between
each investment.
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Characteristics of the surveyed successful applicant businesses (n¼ 15). The 15 surveyed
businesses are highly innovative, often global market leading (12 hold patents or
trademarks) at the time of ACF funding. They are young and small businesses (median
establishment age three years, median six staﬀ), either approaching or in their early
trading stages. They are beyond proof-of-concept and early R&D prototyping and are
reaching later R&D product and service reﬁnement or technical market regulatory testing
stages (in the life science and electronics sectors). At the time of approaching the ACF they
had already received ‘3F’ (founders, family, friends) funding and in several cases already had
angel investment. They required considerable step-change external ﬁnance (e.g. from under
»100,000 for early R&D, to considerably more than »200,000 for later R&D and
commercialisation), representing levels of funding beyond the capacity of the existing
Table 5. Regional distribution of all ACF assisted and surveyed businesses.
Region
Surveyed
business All assisted
All assisted distribution
per ‘000 VAT/PAYE registered
London 4 (27%) 15 (40%) 0.040
East of England 2 (13%) 6 (15%) 0.028
North East 2 (13%) 5 (13%) 0.089
South West 2 (13%) 4 (11%) 0.019
South East 2 (13%) 3 (8%) 0.009
East Midlands 1 (7%) 2 (5%) 0.014
West Midlands 1 (7%) 2 (5%) 0.012
Yorkshire and the Humber 1 (7%) 1 (2%) 0.007
North West 0 1 (2%) 0.005
Total 15 (100%) 39 (100%) 0.018
Source: British Business Bank, December 2013, and Recipient Business Survey.
ACF: Angel Co-investment Fund.
Note: VAT/PAYE enterprise data from UK IDBR 2013 (n¼ 2,167,580). Mann–Whitney U tests at .05 level indicate no
significant difference between samples: Z-score 1.7219, p¼ 0.08544; U-value 20.5 where critical value is 17.
Table 4. Sectoral distribution of all ACF assisted and surveyed businesses.
Sector Surveyed business All assisted
Electrical manufacturing 1 (7%) 3 (8%)
Food and drink 1 (7%) 3 (8%)
Medical & pharmaceutical 2 (13%) 5 (13%)
Software & gaming 6 (40%) 12 (31%)
Online services 1 (7%) 5 (13%)
Cleantech 3 (20%) 6 (15%)
Financial 1 (7%) 3 (8%)
Entertainment 0 2 (5%)
Total 15 (100%) 39 (100%)
Source: British Business Bank, December 2013, and Recipient Business Survey.
ACF: Angel Co-investment Fund.
Note: Mann–Whitney U test at .05 level revealed significant difference in Z-score (2.305, p¼ 0.02088)
and U-value of 9.5 where critical value is 13. This is explained by under representation of online services,
including retail, lettings and fashion activities. Exclusion of this sector leads to U-value of 8.5, at above the
critical value of 8.
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investors. These businesses conform to the classic market gap scenario (Baldock and Mason,
2015), describing themselves as ‘requiring too much funding for angel investment, but too early
stage for either bank or private VC investment’.
(P2) The ACF’s role and impact on the current UK Finance Escalator
Further examination of the surveyed 15 successful ACF business applicants demonstrates
that the ACF is providing considerable step-change ‘stretch’ funding, with average round
sizes more than double those for overall UK angel investment (UKBAA, 2013). These
businesses received an average of »379,000 in ACF funding (range »120,000 to »1.07m,
including four follow-on rounds), with average funding of »1.43m (range »260,000 to
»5.9m) for an average overall shareholding of 12.3% (range 7.9–22.6%), suggesting for
later R&D stage funding the scheme’s 30% share cap is appropriate (Baldock, 2016).
Typically for later R&D, early market entry businesses, funds were sought to
commercialise, recruit and develop sales teams, promote products/services and undertake
later stage R&D reﬁnement. Key staﬀ recruitment and increased capacity (two businesses),
alongside plant and machinery investment in recycling and manufacturing (two) were also
mentioned. Notably, few were undertaking manufacturing, which was typically
subcontracted, mainly within the UK.
The businesses were seeking funding upwards of »200,000 to beyond »2m. Since they did
not have suﬃcient trading track records of more than two years they recognised that they
were ‘unsuited to banks’ and that ‘equity was the only viable type of funding’. The most
common sources of alternative funding considered were private VC (nine businesses),
followed by public and corporate VCs, these cases all contacting at least ﬁve diﬀerent VCs.
A common observation from the feedback they had received fromVCs was that ‘. . .we are too
small for VCs and they ask us to come back to them when we have a trading record and
proﬁtability’. Only one-quarter had received oﬀers from VCs: these were more likely to be
corporate/trade related with detailed knowledge of their sector. However, these investments
oﬀered unacceptably low valuations and restrictive terms. Overall, in line with pecking order
theory there was a preference for ‘smart hands-on angel investors’ and to ‘avoid VC controlling
inﬂuences’. For these businesses, the approach to the ACF was via business angels and ‘the
ACF came in at the end of the funding search and followed-on from angel funding’.
Additionality. Additionality is measured from the CEOs’ judgment of the counterfactual
policy-oﬀ scenario22 and triangulated with assessments from the Lead Angels and the
performance of the unsuccessful businesses. Primarily, the 15 ACF assisted businesses
present a stronger case for project additionality (relating to perceived improved timing
and scale) rather than ﬁnance additionality (relating to perceived lack of availability of
alternative funding), conﬁrming longitudinal ﬁndings for other BIS VC schemes where
lead investors observed that portfolio business CEOs are typically overly optimistic about
fundraising (Baldock and North, 2015). In this study, more than three-quarters of Lead
Angels felt that the investment would not have gone ahead without the ACF.
Only one-ﬁfth of CEOs indicated that they would probably or deﬁnitely not have raised
the ﬁnance required in the ACF round, whereas almost four-ﬁfths indicated that the project
would have been restricted without ACF ﬁnance, with one-ﬁfth likely to have closed and the
remainder evenly split between the project proceeding at reduced scale, or taking longer to
commence. One typical comment was that ‘without the ACF we would have been set back by
as much as a year’. This is a vital consideration for fast moving digitech sectors where ‘being
ﬁrst to the market is everything’. There were four businesses that would have progressed at
the planned project scale and timetable without the ACF, due either to alternative funding
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oﬀers or a view that the 3–4 months application process would have yielded suﬃcient
alternative investors. However, all of these CEOs recognised that the ACF represented a
better deal than more restricted deals oﬀered by corporate VCs or more complex alternative
angel syndicate arrangements. The overriding pecking preference for angel investments over
VCs was widely evidenced:
The VC was only concerned with forcing a quick exit, which was not in the best interest of the
business;
Going with a single corporate VC would have restricted our market potential;
We did not want a large single investor or VC controlling us.
The ﬁve rejected businesses experiences, four at the initial application and one at follow-on
funding stage, support the Lead Angels’ more conservative alternative investment views. The
initial ACF applicants were at later stage R&D and early commercialisation, like their
successful counterparts, but with slightly smaller scale funding requirements (seeking
»135,000 to »350,000 of ACF towards total rounds of »625,000 to »1.5m). Failure to
secure ACF led two businesses to proceed immediately on a smaller scale, one business
to take longer to embark on the project and on a smaller scale and one business to close
‘because we spent so long focusing on securing ACF ﬁnance that when we were rejected there
was insuﬃcient angel ﬁnance to proceed’. The business rejected for follow-on funding
also closed down. All of these businesses failed to attract alternative investment to
replace ACF.
Impacts on recipient businesses. Assessing the impact of the scheme at such an early stage
is diﬃcult to calculate, particularly with ﬁve businesses assisted within the last year and four
in pre-trading at the time of receiving ACF funding. However, it is possible to triangulate
qualitative assessment from CEO and Lead Angel interviews with some quantitative
assessment, including benchmarking with a parallel study of the Enterprise Capital Funds
(Baldock and Mason, 2015).
All of the assisted businesses mentioned positive factors, including progressing R&D
(seven businesses improved or licensed new patents and trademarks), testing and sales and
marketing, in one case leading to a »2m licensing contract. Overall, the ACF was judged
attributable for at least one-third (median 33%, mean 37%) of subsequent business
development (ranging from the 9% ACF share of the business up to 100% where without
ACF closure would have occurred). In the vast majority of cases CEOs considered that the
ACF contribution was making a substantive contribution, over and above its proportional
share of investment; ‘the extra funding received from ACF allowed us to pass a tipping point to
generate sales and marketing momentum’. In net terms, this catalytic eﬀect can be expressed
asþ 10.4% on average (37% average impact, less 26.6% average ACF investment
contribution) and is similar to that recorded for the ECF (Baldock and Mason, 2015).
For the 10 surveyed businesses receiving their ACF funding at least one year prior to the
survey (ranging from 13 to 20 months), sales turnover had increased by three-ﬁfths (median
increase »80,000, ranging from a decline of »150,000 in a case where sales were curtailed to
focus on R&D, up to »1.3m for a rapid growing global ﬁntech) and employment had
doubled (median increase of three staﬀ, ranging from 0 to 80) (Table 6). Forecasts for the
14 surveyed businesses currently in the ACF portfolio (excluding a meditech trade sale),
suggesting that aggregate sales turnover will increase rapidly, almost trebling over the next
year (median increase »655,000) and by 20 times over the next three (median increase
»5.63m). Aggregate employment is expected to increase by three-quarters (median
increase six staﬀ) over the next year and to almost double (median increase 18) within
three years (Table 6).
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These projected ﬁgures are in-line with those found in the early assessment of the ECF
and UKIIF,23 as the businesses project their rise out of the base of the ‘J’ curve, from only
one currently in proﬁt to all being proﬁtable within three years, as they approach investment
exit, typically estimated at between two to at least ﬁve years (median four years). However,
as noted by the surveyed Lead Angels and by VC managers in other recent UK studies
(Baldock and Mason, 2015; Baldock and North, 2015), CEOs are typically over-optimistic in
respect of growth and exit timetables and these ﬁgures should be treated with caution. It is
notable that one-third of the surveyed ACF businesses had already slipped back by up to six
months in their exit timetables, reﬂecting the increasing length of time required to achieve an
exit in the post-GFC period (Axelson and Martinovic, 2012; CfEL, 2013; EVCA, 2013;
Mason and Botelho, 2016). This is an area of concern for angels but they, like their
portfolio businesses, are buoyed by the capacity for the ACF to provide substantial
follow-on funding. Three-quarters (11) of the businesses envisage requiring further follow-
on funding (ranging from »100,000 for working capital up to »20m to fund international
business growth) and one-third (5) believe that this will include further investment from the
ACF, whilst four have already received further ACF ﬁnance. It remains too early to predict
the likely success of the future ACF exits.
(P3) The ACF’s impact on UK business angel investing
These ﬁndings draw upon the interviews with 19 Lead Angels. All exhibited considerable
business management experience. Two-thirds (12) had made at least ﬁve previous
Table 6. Aggregate actual (when funded and current) and forecast (for one and three years) for annual
sales turnover performance and employment.
Funded » Current » Change » % change
Annual sales turnover
Recipients (at least one year
before survey) n¼ 10
4,120,000 6,565,000 2,445,000 59.3%
Current » 1 year » Change » % change
Recipients (all current
ACF portfolio) n¼ 14
6,680,000 25,815,000 19,135,000 286.4%
Current » 3 years » Change » % change
Recipients (all current
ACF portfolio) n¼ 14
6,680,000 142,500,000 135,820,000 2033.3%
Funded Current Change % change
Total employment
Recipients (at least one year
before survey) n¼ 10
111 221 110 99.9%
Current 1 year Change % change
Recipients (all current ACF
portfolio) n¼ 14
229 406 177 77.5%
Current 3 years Change % change
Recipients (all current ACF
portfolio) n¼ 14
229 645 416 181.8%
ACF: Angel Co-investment Fund.
Note: Only 10 cases have received ACF at least one year prior to the time of the survey and only 14 cases provided
current and future projections as one case had been sold.
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investments, whilst just one had only made one previous investment. Eight had managed
their own business, eight had ﬁnancial management experience (including buying and selling
businesses and raising external ﬁnance) and nine had consulted for businesses. There was no
obvious diﬀerence between the successful and unsuccessful angels. Indeed, three of the
unsuccessful investors had previously made successful applications to the ACF. They
admitted that, if anything, they had been ‘guilty of expecting the second application to be
easier than the ﬁrst’. It is therefore clear that the ACF, in its early stages, has attracted
experienced, sophisticated Lead investors, whether successful or not.
The syndication process was dominated by loose and ad hoc angel groupings, with little
involvement by professionally-managed angel capital groups, as found in Scotland (Mason
et al., 2016). Just three Lead Angels managed their own syndicates and one other was a
member of a formal syndicate. A further six were members of loose, ﬂuid groups where the
Lead Angel role rotated, including membership of BANs where the actual investors and
Lead Angel varied with each investment. The remaining Lead Angels had been attracted to
the business or were recruited through an intermediary. The concept of Lead Angel therefore
appears quite ﬂexible with some of these already experienced angels appearing in other ACF
cases as syndicate members. Leadership was determined by a variety of factors, including
experience, strong desire to invest in the business including sector knowledge and invitations
from existing business investors who could not lead under ACF rules.
In summary, the evidence points to the ACF collaborating (although not working
directly) with experienced angel investors and members of established angel groups and
networks, notably in London, Thames Valley and Cambridge, enhancing their
eﬀectiveness in making investments. The London Business Angels have been particularly
active in promoting the scheme, resulting in members engaging with the ACF and providing
a high proportion of Lead Angels (almost one third), although some investee companies
were outside London. However, the overall feature of investment syndicates is of ad hoc,
constantly changing groupings. The scheme has not impacted on the formation of new
managed groups, or networks. Indeed, for the vast majority there was no indication that
the ACF syndicate would invest again together in another business. Nor has ACF
encouraged involvement of new angels.24 It also appears that the ACF regional
roadshows have made a limited impact on raising awareness of the scheme amongst
organised network groups.
Process issues. A key ACF aim is to improve the quality of angel investment by operating
a rigorous application process. This involves producing a business investment proposition
paper and a telephone presentation to the IC. This was not a concern for the vast majority of
the interviewed angels who were experienced and successful investors and business people.
One even praised the ACF as ‘easily the best public VC’ that they had dealt with. Crucially,
the ACF administration team at the British Business Bank provide clear guidance from the
start of the process, ensuring that only strong cases are developed iteratively with them and
reach the IC with a high expectation of success. Those with the best experiences had engaged
fully with the ACF throughout the process, receiving helpful high level feedback. Three
angels (including two unsuccessful applicants) complained about lack of clarity (website
and written documentation) and delays in receiving information.
From a business perspective the ACF was widely welcomed. From the Lead Angels’
perspective the IC’s available time is quite limited and it was understood that they were
assessing the angel’s competence, as one put it ‘to push back the concerns and risks raised in
the investment paper’. However, for a minority of investors its process seemed incongruous,
as it lengthened the application period, led to uncertainty of outcomes and did not directly
involve the entrepreneurs. Indeed, they had no contact with the IC. The entrepreneurs
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therefore treated the IC with suspicion and several mentioned that it was an unreasonable
burden to expect the Lead Angel to have the technical knowledge to present their case. These
interviewees mostly failed to comprehend that the IC was testing the angel, rather than their
business.
Only a small minority of businesses and Lead Angels criticised the application process.
These were mainly unsuccessful applicants. They revealed agency and transactional cost
factors (Akerlof, 1976). First, whilst the scheme saved search time for more investors,
some business CEOs mentioned this was oﬀ-set by the several months required to prepare
an investment paper (the median application to funding receipt time was four months). As
one Lead investor commented, ‘we had put all our eggs in one basket’. Indeed, rejected ACF
applicant businesses faced the risk that investor pledges would not be honoured because of
the time delay and one business failure occurred for this reason. Second, application process
delays occurred where administration staﬀ were under pressure from the volume of enquiries
and applications. A third criticism is that the scheme is overly rigid, notably in deﬁning new
money, the eﬀect of which is to exclude knowledgeable existing investors from being ACF
Lead investors. Fourth, there were concerns that ACF behaves as a ‘lead investor’, rather
than following investors (like the Scottish CIF and recent EAF pilots). However, this can be
seen as a consequence of the scheme’s objective of raising the standard of investments. Fifth,
investors wanted the IC to provide clear, detailed feedback for rejections, oﬀering
opportunity to reassess and re-apply. Finally, although the experienced angels are mostly
successful and understand the process, particularly those with institutional25 investment
experience, it was widely viewed by the angels and business CEOs that the application
process could be ‘daunting and oﬀ-putting to less experienced angels’.
Conclusions and policy implications
This early assessment of the ACF is limited by the scheme’s initial scale and data restrictions,
not least their cross-sectional nature. Nonetheless, it reveals clear, important messages with
resonance for CIF theory, policy development and Lerner’s (2010) call for further public VC
scheme evaluations.
Proposition one revealed the ACF’s initial business funding distribution as heavily biased
towards the London, East of England and North East regions where existing formal BANs
are strongly present, supporting previous ﬁndings of A-OCIF linking to thriving
entrepreneurial ecosystems, BAN clusters (Mason and Harrison, 2015; Mason et al.,
2013). ACF investment was also skewed towards shorter horizon digitechs (underscored
by the low median prediction of four years to exit) favoured by UK investor tax
incentives (Baldock and Mason, 2015). The ACF assisted highly innovative, early stage
businesses, typically at the second angel round where substantial funding is required to
scale-up (Baldock and Mason, 2015). From a policy perspective, anecdotal UKBAA26
evidence demonstrated limited ACF knowledge amongst angels, supporting the suggestion
of key informants to increase scheme promotion regionally, through UKBAA roadshows.
This would be feasible where there are existing angel networks, but might be ineﬀective in
reaching angels in regions that lack networks and where more infrastructural linking and
support for angel collaborations may be required.
Proposition two clearly demonstrated that the ACF is meeting its aim of addressing the
funding gap for early stage potential high growth businesses, particularly those seeking
second round step-change ‘stretch’ funding in the »500,000 to »2m range, beyond the
normal scope of angel syndicates (Mason et al., 2016). It is therefore helping the new
post-GFC UK funding escalator gain traction (Baldock and Mason, 2015; North et al.,
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2013). The scheme exhibited high levels of attributed additionality (Baldock and North,
2015), very low levels of potential crowding out (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003) – none
with other public sector schemes including the ECFs (Baldock and Mason, 2015), and
with business managers demonstrating a preference, consistent with pecking order theory,
for ‘smart angel money’ over ‘controlling VCs’ (Baldock and Mason, 2015; Wiltbank, 2009).
From an economic development policy perspective, the initial ACF impacts on funded
businesses were considerable, driving forward R&D, creating jobs (including spillovers to
UK manufacturers) and increasing business revenue. The scheme’s evergreen ﬂexibility
to accommodate substantial follow-on funding rounds, either to reach exit or bridge the
gap to further ﬁnance (e.g. BGF), will help meet growing ‘series A-B’ demands (Baldock,
2016; Baldock and Mason, 2015), and has already demonstrated ability to deliver growth
momentum in assisted businesses, maintaining their market primacy.
Proposition three, relating to the ACF’s individual investor case assessment approach, as
opposed to the Scottish CIF and EAF preferred partner, passive investment model, proved
most problematic. Whilst the ACF undoubtedly attracted successful experienced investors
who could provide good hands on investment management skills (Mason and Harrison,
2015), provided credibility and facilitated ad hoc syndication, there was no evidence that
the good practice that was being espoused by ACF was being diﬀused to other group
members or the wider angel community. From an agency (Akerlof, 1976) and transaction
cost (Hayton et al., 2008) perspective, there were concerns that the application process took
too long (median of four months), creating investor uncertainty and undermining investment
time advantages oﬀered by CIFs. Furthermore, although the ACF is a light touch investor,
only intervening post-investment if angels require assistance, it does require quite intensive
initial application support from the administration team to quickly ﬁlter out poor
applications and nurture stronger ones. Early assessment suggests the ACF’s complex
application process and demanding due diligence suit experienced institutional investors,
and are oﬀ-putting for less experienced investors, with high initial application attrition
rates seemingly inﬂuenced at least as much by discouragement as unsuitability. Future
policy research should therefore focus on better assisting formal angel group and network
development across the regions and more directly raising the standard of angel investing
(Mason et al., 2013; Wilson and Silva, 2013) to enable more eﬀective take-up of the scheme.
In the ﬁnal analysis, a decision is required regarding whether ACF is to be niche or volume
intervention. Currently it is too small to ‘shift the needle’ suﬃciently to make a substantial
diﬀerence to the early stage entrepreneurial ﬁnance market. It therefore requires to scale-up to
make an impact. However, we have noted that even in its pilot phase administrative capacity
points have been reached on certain occasions. If the scheme does signiﬁcantly expand in scale
it will require to substantially increase its administrative and IC staﬃng capacity to eﬀectively
meet the demand that will be stimulated by its greater visibility.
Acknowledgements
This paper is based on research undertaken on behalf of the UK Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills (subsequently renamed Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy) and the
British Business Bank. All views expressed are those of the authors only.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
18 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 0(0)
Funding
The author(s) received no ﬁnancial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Notes
1. Initial public offering (IPO) on a public equity market.
2. The UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) for small cap firms, typically with less than »100m
asset base.
3. More recently the UK exit markets have improved, with AIM becoming more liquid and attractive
in 2014 (Baldock, 2015).
4. SEIS applies to investments into UK based companies with under 25 employees and up to
»200,000 in assets with a maximum company allowance of »150,000 per annum and individual
investment allowance of »100,000 per annum. Offering a maximum of 50% Income Tax relief and
Capital Gains Tax exemption if shares are held for at least 3 years (HMRC, 22/10/2013).
5. The Business Growth Fund (BGF) was established in 2011 by five major UK banks to fund
businesses with annual sales turnover of between »10m and »500m with between »2m and
»10m. The initial threshold was subsequently lowered to »5m.
6. Since the EU raised the state aid threshold in January 2014, ECFs can now offer up to double the
amount of public funding (now »50m), if matched by at least one third private investment.
7. ECF public sector returns are currently capped at 3%.
8. A parallel Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) also operates in the UK for larger SMEs with
under 250 employees and »15m assets.
9. For example, the UK ECFs are 10 year LPs, which are extendable to 12 years under agreement
with the British Business Bank.
10. British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), UK Business Angel Association (UKBAA) and
European Investment Fund (EIF) representatives all supported evergreen approaches in January
2014.
11. The ACF initially received a »50m Regional Growth Fund endowment with returns being
recycled, doubling to »100m in July 2013 through a British Business Bank 15 year term non-
subordinated loan.
12. Specifically matching business angel funding in the »200,000 to »2m range, although total round
sizes, including all investors can be larger.
13. Complying with European Union state aid requirements for SMEs.
14. Raising some informants to question whether it is adequately promoted and suited to angel groups
outside of England.
15. The Board comprises the original bid partner organisations: Oxford Investment Opportunity
Network, Braveheart Investment Group Ltd, Octopus Investments, Hotspur Capital Partners.
16. ACF Presentation to UKBAA, London 29/01/2014.
17. The implication is that the syndicate can be a new grouping, but must be formed in time to actively
work together on the ACF application.
18. In practice some CEOs reported this to be 40–50 pages.
19. In practice business respondents suggested that the ACF quite frequently sets the investment
terms.
20. Tables 4 and 5 present Mann–Whitney U tests demonstrating that the survey sample is not
significantly different from the overall assisted population for regional distribution, and is only
significantly different for sectoral distribution in relation to underrepresentation of online services.
21. Ultimate selection of the surveyed businesses and business angels was agreed in consultation with
the British Business Bank, ensuring that commercially sensitive cases were not contacted.
22. Adopting standard BIS protocols for the Early Assessment of Equity Schemes (BIS, 2010) and
UKIIF (BIS, 2012).
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23. BIS (2010) Early Assessment of Equity Schemes; BIS Early Assessment of UKIIF (2012).
24. None of the 19 Lead Angels mentioned involving new angel investors within their ACF syndicates.
25. Those with previous more formalised bank, VC or private equity (PE) lending or syndicating
experience.
26. UKBAA conference, London 29/01/2014.
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